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PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT?
KATHLEEN McGowAN"
No man is an Hand, intire of it selfe;
every man is a peece of the Continent,
apart of the maine;
... any mans death diminishes me,
because I am involved in Mankinde ...'
Modern medical technology allows Americans to live longer,
healthier lives.2 Cures for diseases once considered terminal are
now commonplace.3 Many other lives are extended by means of
medicine, operations, organ transplants, and highly technical
machines.4 At the same time, however, these advances present
moral, ethical, and legal dilemmas where prolonging life seems
only to increase a person's pain and lengthen the dying process.5
When infirmities are incurable and the person can be main-
tained solely in a debilitated condition, he may face a choice of
whether to prolong the dying process.6 The question thus arises
. J.D. Candidate, 1998, St. John's University School of Law. Dedicated to my
son, John, who taught me the value of life.
' John Donne, Devotions XVII, in THE COMPLETE POETRY AND SELECTED PROSE
OF JOHN DONNE & THE COMPLETE POETRY OF WILLIAM BLAKE 331 (John Hayward,
ed., Random House (1941)).
2 See Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1519, 1522 (1990) [hereinafter Developments].
Id. at 1523.
Id. at 1522 n.1
See G. Steven Neeley, The Right to Self-Directed Death: Reconsidering An An-
cient Proscription, 36 CATH. LAw. 111 (1995).
6 "[Mlost people cannot accept and plan for the fact of their own death." JESSE
DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 67 (5th ed.
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whether a competent individual has rights and options concern-
ing decisions affecting his medical treatment and ultimately his
death.7 The attitudes of family, religion, and society influence
that decision-making process and our laws.8
Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari and heard oral arguments9 in two cases involving the
rights of terminally ill' ° competent adults" who wish to end their
1995). "Our own death is indeed unimaginable, and whenever we make the attempt
to imagine it we can perceive that we really survive as spectators. Hence ... at bot-
tom no one believes in his own death...." Id. (quoting Sigmund Freud, Our Attitude
Towards Death, in 4 COLLECTED PAPERS 304 (1925)).
7 A patient has the right to be informed about his medical condition and his
treatment options by his doctor. The patient can give his consent or refuse a pro-
posed treatment. Brief of Amici Curiae for the American Medical Association, The
American Nurses Association, and The American Psychiatric Association, et al. in
Support of Petitioners at *3, Washington v. Glucksberg, No. 96-110 (S.Ct. filed Nov.
12, 1996), 1996 WL 656263 [hereinafter AMA Amicus Brief] (citing AMA Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS). The New York State Task
Force on Life and the Law defines the distinction between assisted suicide and
euthanasia as follows:
Assisted suicide occurs when one person assists another to take his or her
own life, either by providing the means to commit suicide or by taking
other necessary steps. Euthanasia entails direct measures, such as a lethal
injection, by one person to end another person's life. Euthanasia may be
voluntary, performed with the explicit consent of a competent adult, or it
can be performed without consent, in which case it is usually called
"nonvoluntary" euthanasia. Euthanasia provided over the patient's objec-
tion is generally referred to as "involuntary" euthanasia. Both assisted
suicide and euthanasia are distinct from the withdrawal or withholding of
life-sustaining treatment.
NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT:
ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 1 (1994) [hereinafter
TASK FORCE, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT]. The mission of the Task Force, established
in 1985 by Governor Mario Cuomo, is to recommend public policy on issues arising
from medical advances, including life sustaining treatment. Id. at vii. The Task
Force's twenty five members include doctors, lawyers, academics, and representa-
tives of the religious community. Id.
' See generally Neeley, supra note 5; TASK FORCE, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT, su-
pra note 7, at 77-113.
9 On October 1, 1996, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear cases from
the Ninth Circuit and the Second Circuit on the constitutionality of physician as-
sisted suicide. 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996). On January 8, 1997, the Supreme Court heard
two hours of oral arguments in Washington v. Glucksberg (No 96-110) and Vacco v.
Quill (No. 95-1858). The cases attracted national attention in the news media; the
courthouse was filled to capacity during the arguments. Many individuals, states,
and organizations filed Amicus Briefs with the Court. The justices will decide the
cases by early summer of 1997.
" "Though widely used, ['terminal illness'] is not a standard technical term with
clear and precise criteria." Ronald Bayer et al., The Care of the Terminally Ill: Mo-
rality and Economics, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1490, 1491 (1983).
" "The elements of competence to make medical decisions are the possession of
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lives with the assistance of a physician. In Washington v.
Glucksberg, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,"
and Vacco v. Quill, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit,"3 held, respectively, that the laws of the states of Washing-
ton 4 and New York 5 prohibiting one person from aiding another
to commit suicide violated rights guaranteed by the United
States Constitution. Each court held that terminally ill patients
have the right to physician assisted suicide but reached their
conclusions on separate Constitutional grounds."
The Ninth Circuit en banc, in Washington v. Glucksberg,7
held that a terminally ill, competent adult has a constitutionally
guaranteed, "liberty interest in determining the time and man-
ner of one's own death."8 The Washington statute prohibiting
assisted suicide, therefore, violated the Substantive Due Process
a set of personal values and goals, the ability to communicate with others and to
understand information provided by others, and the capacity to reason and deliber-
ate about the decision." Developments, supra note 2, at 1644 n.10.
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted
sub nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 37 (U.S. October 1, 1996) (No. 96-
110). The plaintiffs are a coalition of three terminally ill patients, four physicians
who treat terminally ill patients, and a non-profit organization that provides coun-
seling, support, and assistance to terminally ill patients considering suicide. Id. at
794. Since the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to this case under
the name Washington v. Glucksberg, this Comment hereinafter refers to the case as
Glucksberg rather than Compassion in Dying.
Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S.Ct. 36 (U.S. Oct. 1,
1996) (No. 95 - 1858). Since the Supreme Court of the United States granted certio-
rari under the name Vacco v. Quill, this Comment herinafter will refer to the case
as Vacco v. Quill or Quill.
" "A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes
or aides another person to attempt suicide." WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060 (1987).
" "A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he intentionally
causes or aids another person to attempt suicide." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30
(McKinney 1987). "A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when: ...
[hie intentionally causes or aids another person to commit suicide." Id. § 125.15(3).
16 The Ninth Circuit found a Substantive Due Process constitutional right to
physician assisted suicide, Glucksberg, at 793-94, while the Second Circuit found an
Equal Protection constitutional right, Quill at 727.
'" 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996). The trial court declared the statute unconstitu-
tional and granted summary judgment to plaintiffs. Washington v. Glucksberg, 850
F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994). On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals voted 2-1 to reverse. 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995). The majority
held that there was no Due Process liberty interest in physician assisted suicide and
the state statute did not violate the Equal Protection clause. Id. at 590. Because of
the importance of the case, the Ninth Circuit decided to rehear it en banc. 79 F.3d
790 (9th Cir. 1996).
" Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 793.
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.19 Writing for the court,
Judge Reinhardt"° emphasized that an individual's "right to
choose" outweighed the state's interest in protecting life.2' The
court reasoned from the legal standards presented in two prior
Supreme Court cases: Planned Parenthood v. Casey22 and Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.23
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Beezer argued that state in-
terests outweighed the asserted liberty interest of the individual
because the statute rationally advanced legitimate governmental
purposes.24 Judge Beezer stated that, historically, there was no
precedent allowing physicians to assist patients in killing them-
selves, that the laws of the state regulating the medical profes-
sion prohibited such acts, and that the finding of a constitutional
right to suicide will lead down the "slippery slope" to voluntary
euthanasia and, ultimately, to involuntary euthanasia. 5
In other dissenting opinions, Judge Fernandez declared that
there is no "constitutional right whatever to commit suicide"6
while Judge Kleinfeld "doubted" there is a constitutional right to
commit suicide.27 Judge Kleinfeld continued that it was "wrong"
for the majority to say there is no difference between giving
medicine to relieve pain and giving medication to cause death."
The Second Circuit in Vacco v. Quill29 held that a terminally
"Id. at 793-94, 838.
20 See Garrett Epps, Judges Who Support the Right to Die, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Jan. 13, 1997,'at 28 (articulating a perspective on the professional lives of
Federal Judges Stephen Reinhardt, Ninth Circuit, and Roger Miner, Second Cir-
cuit).
21 Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 836-39 ("We are allowing individuals to make the de-
cisions that so profoundly affect their very existence-and precluding the state from
intruding excessively into that critical realm.").
22 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming Roe v. Wade's finding of liberty interest in
woman's right to abortion on basis of stare decisis).
23 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (finding state's requirement of clear and convincing evi-
dence of patient's wishes to permit discontinuance of artificial life-support is not
violation of Substantive Due Process).
24 Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 839 (Beezer, J., dissenting). Judge Beezer asserted
that an individual has "an ordinary nonfundamental, liberty interest" in physician
assisted suicide. Id. However, that state has the right on a rational basis to prohibit
assisted suicide. Id.
21 Id. at 856-57 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
26 Id. at 857 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
27 Id. at 857 (Keinfeld, J., dissenting).
28 Id. at 858 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
29 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996). The trial court granted summary judgment to the
defendants, the Attorney General of the State of New York, the Governor, and the
District Attorney for New York County. 870 F.Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). The plain-
228
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ill patient has the right, under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause, to have a physician aid the hastening of
death by suicide." While deciding there was no fundamental
constitutional right to assisted suicide, the court found that all
terminally ill persons were similarly situated.3' Those denied
medication to end life, therefore, were denied equal protection of
laws that allowed other terminally ill patients on life support to
shorten their lives by refusing further medical treatment.2
Writing for the court, Judge Miner33 declared that the state can-
not have an interest in prolonging "a life that is all but ended."34
He stated that hastening one's death by refusing life-sustaining
treatment was indistinguishable from ending one's life with a le-
thal dose of medication, thereby concluding that the state's pro-
hibition of physician assisted suicide was irrational. 5
In a concurring opinion, Judge Calabresi agreed that the
New York statutes against assisted suicide, as enacted, pres-
ently "cannot stand"6 but did not believe that the validity of the
statutes are ready for "final judgment under either Due Process
or Equal Protection" analysis.37 Judge Calabresi left open the
question of whether new and different statutes prohibiting as-
sisted suicide, if enacted by New York, would survive constitu-
tional scrutiny.3"
The Ninth and Second Circuits clearly agreed on a right of
tiffs were three medical doctors and their patients who had asked the trial court to
declare unconstitutional the state laws banning assisted suicide as violating 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Id. The court found that there was no fundamental constitutional
right to physician assisted suicide. Id. at 84. The trial court reasoned that the
state's distinction between refusing treatment and taking prescribed lethal medica-
tion was clear and rational, and that the state had a legitimate interest in preserv-
ing life. Id. Moreover, the court thought the debate on assisted suicide should be left
to the legislative process. Id. at 85.
30 Quill, 80 F.3d at 731.
31 "[I]t seems clear that New York does not treat similarly circumstanced per-
sons alike." Id. at 729.
32 id.
33 See Epps, supra note 20, at 28 (articulating a perspective on the professional
lives of Federal Judges Stephen Reinhardt, Ninth Circuit, and Roger Miner, Second
Circuit).
Quill, 80 F.3d at 743.
35 id.
36 Id. at 732 (Calabresi, J., concurring). The statutes prohibiting assisted sui-
cide were enacted in conjunction with statutes outlawing suicide itself. Id. Since
criminal penalties against suicide have been removed Judge Calabresi asserted that
the assisted suicide statutes need re-examination. Id. at 732-35.
37 id.
31 Quill, 80 F.3d at 729.
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terminally ill patients to have physician aid in suicide. The
Ninth Circuit, however, found a constitutionally guaranteed lib-
erty interest39 while the Second Circuit found no fundamental
right or liberty interest. ° The Ninth Circuit found a Substantive
Due Process violation by state law"' while the Second Circuit re-
jected a Substantive Due Process right to physician assisted sui-
cide.4" The Ninth Circuit did not reach the Equal Protection
analysis because it concluded that one constitutional violation of
Due Process was sufficient to reach its decision." The Second
Circuit found that state prohibition of physician assisted suicide
for the terminally ill lacks any rational basis and violates the
Equal Protection guarantees of the Constitution." Apparently,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari either to resolve the con-
flict in reasoning between the Circuits or to rule that both courts
were incorrect.
This Comment suggests that there is no constitutionally
guaranteed right to suicide and there is no Substantive Due
Process or Equal Protection violation of the Constitution by the
states in prohibiting physician assisted suicide. Thus, the Su-
preme Court should reverse both the Ninth and Second Circuit
decisions. Part One of this Comment examines the Substantive
Due Process argument of Washington v. Glucksberg. Part Two
examines the Equal Protection argument of Vacco v.Quill. Part
Three provides an overview of the public policy issues implicated
in the legalization of physician assisted suicide and focuses on
solutions other than suicide for the terminally ill in our society.
Finally, this Comment concludes that suicide, although quick
and efficient, is not an acceptable solution to terminal illness in a
civilized society. The end of life is a part of the process of living
and should not be feared and distorted by the courts and our le-
gal system. As a society we should choose life affirming care and
pain management for the terminally ill instead of accepting the
despair and hopelessness of suicide.
3' Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 793-94.
Quill, 80 F.3d at 724.
4' Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 793-94, 798 (9th Cir. 1996).
Quill, 80 F.3d at 724-25 (2d Cir. 1996).
Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 798.
Quill, 80 F.3d at 731.
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I. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion guarantees that the state may not deprive anyone of "life,
liberty or property without due process of law." The Supreme
Court has interpreted this Amendment to encompass not only
Procedural Due Process rights" but also Substantive Due Proc-
ess rights."7 Two standards of review comprise the Substantive
Due Process analysis: either a "rational basis" or "strict scrutiny"
analysis. State legislation of an economic or social nature must
be "rationally related" to the state's interest in regulating the
activity in question." If state regulations impinge on a
"fundamental right," however, they must be supported by a
"compelling" state interest and the law must be narrowly tai-
lored to achieve the state's objective. 9 The "strict scrutiny"
analysis requires a court to weigh the fundamental right of the
individual against the compelling interest of the state in regulat-
ing the fundamental right.5 ° A determination is then made as to
whether the state regulates more than is necessary to achieve its
4' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
46 The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in the procedural context
has been interpreted to mean that the state government cannot deny any person
certain safeguards or procedures before taking away their property, their liberty or
their life. See generally ALBERT H. PUTNEY, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY AND LAW § 245 (1985). Examples include a trial by jury in criminal cases,
the right to appeal an adverse decision, payment for personal property taken by the
state, and the right to have counsel present at a hearing. Id. at §§ 246-49.
" The Supreme Court has interpreted Substantive Due Process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment as those rights, although not specifically enumerated,
which implicate "fundamental liberties so 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'
that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed." Quill v. Vacco,
80 F.3d 716, 723 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26
(1937)). The fundamental liberties identified by the Second Circuit include freedom
of association, the right to vote, the right to interstate travel, the right to fairness in
criminal process, and the right to privacy. Quill, 80 F.3d at 724.
' United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (stating that
"legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced un-
constitutional unless ... it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that
it rests upon some rational basis....").
49 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding marriage, though not
mentioned in the Constitution, is a fundamental civil right and any state regulation
of it must serve a compelling state interest).
50 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (finding law forbidding use
of contraceptives unconstitutional because state regulation may not reach so broadly
as to invade areas of "protected freedoms"); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)
(upholding state regulation that favors childbirth over abortion by using state funds
to encourage childbirth as not violating substantive due process).
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goal and whether the state regulation should be permitted to
stand.51 Notwithstanding the Court's traditional "fundamental
right" analysis, the Supreme Court has recently discussed Sub-
stantive Due Process rights in terms of a "liberty interest."12 It
seems unclear, however, as to whether a liberty interest is sub-
ject to "strict scrutiny" review as a fundamental right or subject
to a new middle level of scrutiny as an important right.53
In Glucksberg, the Ninth Circuit found a Due Process
"See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (finding ordinance re-
stricting speech solely on the basis of content is facially unconstitutional).
52 Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851(1992). The Court described the "liberty interest" in
this way:
[Tihe full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot
be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees else-
where provided in the Constitution. This 'liberty' is not a series of isolated
points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of
speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational con-
tinuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints, ... and which also recog-
nizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain inter-
ests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to
justify their abridgment."
Id. at 848-49 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting on
other grounds)).
The Casey Court continued, "We invoke [the Constitution] once again to define
the freedom guaranteed by the Constitution's own promise, the promise of liberty."
Id. at 901. The Supreme Court of the United States, in the assisted suicide context,
is grappling once again with the definition of liberty in the Substance Due Process
context. At Oral Arguments, the question arose time and again. Professor Lawrence
Tribe of Harvard, arguing in favor of assisted suicide, defined it this way for the
Court:
Liberty interest in this case is the liberty, when facing imminent and inevi-
table death, not to be forced by the government to endure a degree of pain
and suffering that one can relieve only by being completely unconscious.
Not to be forced into that choice, that the liberty is the freedom, at this
threshold at the end of life, not to be a creature of the state but to have
some voice in the question of how much pain one is really going through.
Vacco v. Quill, No. 95-1858, 1997 WL 13672, at *55-56 (United States Supreme
Court Official Transcript of Oral Argument Jan. 8, 1997).
"' Quill, 80 F.3d at 723-24. ("[T]he list of rights the Supreme Court has actually
or impliedly identified as fundamental, and therefore qualified for heightened judi-
cial protection include" those in Bill of Rights as well as others) (emphasis added to
show mixed use of terms). The Ninth Circuit may have characterized the right to
assisted suicide as a liberty interest rather than a pure fundamental right for the
purpose of passing muster with the Supreme Court especially in view of the Su-
preme Court's asserted reluctance to find new fundamental rights. Glucksberg, 79
F.3d at 799-804 (relying on Justice Harlan's definition of liberty interest in his dis-
sent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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"liberty interest" in the "right to die."" This finding of a liberty
interest, if a fundamental right, subjects the state law prohibit-
ing assistance in suicide to strict scrutiny by the Court.55 To
withstand strict scrutiny, the state must show a compelling in-
terest in regulating the activity. 6 If the liberty interest is less
than a fundamental right, the Court will use a "heightened"
scrutiny analysis.57 For a regulation to withstand this scrutiny,
the state must show a "heightened" or important interest in
regulating the activity and that preservation of that interest can
not be achieved in a less burdensome manner.5 8 The Ninth Cir-
cuit stated that the state's important interests are subject to
balancing against the individual's asserted liberty interest.59
Under either standard, Substantive Due Process, in effect, limits
the power of the government to regulate certain rights guaran-
teed by the Constitution.
Relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in Cruzan ° and
Casey6 to define the right to determine "the time and manner of
one's death," " the Ninth Circuit analysis was flawed in several
respects. First, the court relied on Casey to establish an over-
broad right to self-determination, analogizing a right to suicide
with a right to abortion. Second, through questionable balancing
of interests, the court concluded that the patient's interest in
death outweighed the state's interest in preserving life. Third,
the court's historical analysis was inaccurate. Fourth, the court
failed to distinguish between a physician providing a lethal dose
Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 816.
"5 "The determination that must now be made is whether the state's attempt to
curtail the exercise of that interest is constitutionally justified." Id.
" See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down ban on interra-
cial marriage).
57 Casey, 505 U.S. at 853.
s8 Id.
" Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 836.
60 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). The Glucksberg
court interpreted Cruzan as recognizing that a liberty interest in rejecting un-
wanted medical treatment exists - even if that rejection of medical treatment would
lead to death. Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 814-16. The court, therefore, went on to
"conclude that Cruzan, by recognizing a liberty interest that includes the refusal of
artificial provision of life-sustaining food and water, necessarily recognizes a liberty
interest in hastening one's own death." Id. at 816.
" Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). "Casey ... provide[s] per-
suasive evidence that the Constitution encompasses a due process liberty interest in
controlling the time and manner of one's death...." Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 816.
6' Glucksberg, at 793.
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of medication and a patient's refusal of further medical treat-
ment. Finally, the court restricted the right to suicide to the
terminally ill, whereas a Constitutional right to suicide, if found,
should seemingly adhere equally to all persons regardless of age,
health, or other life circumstance.
A. Planned Parenthood v. Casey: Abortion as a Precedent for
Suicide
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Ca-
sey,63 the Supreme Court, following precedent established in Roe
v. Wade,' reaffirmed a woman's right to an abortion. Addition-
ally, the Casey Court discussed the substantive component of the
word "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment."6 "It," the Court
stated, "is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter."" Never-
theless, the Court's holding in Casey needs to be viewed in light
of the particular facts of that case, namely, a woman's right to an
abortion, especially since the Court stated that "[a]bortion is a
unique act."67 Moreover, the liberty interest defined in Casey
pertained to choosing the mother's life over that of her fetus, not
physician assisted suicide.' The Casey Court does not authorize
any person to assist in the killing an independent human life. 9
In prior decisions, the Court defined liberty interests in the
fundamental rights in marriage," bearing and begetting a child,7
63 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (finding liberty interest in woman's right to abortion
while not using term "fundamental right" as Court did in Roe v. Wade).
410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding "the right of personal privacy includes the
abortion decision....").
' "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
'6 Id. at 847.
17 Id. at 852.
68 In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973), the Court described a fetus as
"potential life", not a person. The Casey Court describes the fetus in a similar man-
ner. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870. The Casey Court explained "that the concept of viability,
as we noted in Roe, is the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining
and nourishing a life outside the womb...." Id.
69 See AMA Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *24 (stating that "[n]either Roe nor
Casey authorizes any person to assist in killing an independent human life" because
"a woman's right to choose to have an abortion differs materially from a patient's
right to physician assisted suicide.").
70 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down ban on interracial mar-
riage because state cannot interfere with fundamental right to marry).
7' Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (stating "right of privacy
means...to be free from unwarranted government intrusion into matters so funda-
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and contraception."2 The Court, however, had not previously ad-
dressed suicide as a liberty interest. The Ninth Circuit, never-
theless, extended the language of the Court discussing intimate
family matters of marriage and procreation to include all points
in a person's life, ultimately finding a liberty interest in suicide.73
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit quickly clarified the right as not
only a liberty interest in suicide, but also a broader right to de-
termine "the time and manner of one's death" and "a right to
hasten[] one's death."74 Viewed in this light, a liberty interest
could arguably extend to any matter in which an individual as-
serts a "right to choose." The issue then arises whether a state
can ban, for example, personal use of illicit drugs, prostitution,
or unapproved experimental medical procedures when an indi-
vidual asserts a "right to choose." Thus, an analysis of the basic
distinction between abortion rights and suicide rights is neces-
sary. The Court, in finding a right to abortion in the right to pri-
vacy, balanced the interests of a woman against what the court
termed "potential life."75 The state's preserved its interest in the
life of the woman because before and after the abortion the
7 77woman was alive.6  By not recognizing the fetus as a person,
mentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."); see
Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (stating that "[tihe de-
cision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of this cluster of
constitutionally protected choices.").
72 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding zone of privacy created
several fundamental constitutional guarantees not specifically enumerated in Con-
stitution).
73 Glucksberg, 79 F.3d 790, 800-01. "In right to die cases the outcome of the bal-
ancing test may differ at different points along the life cycle as a person's physical or
medical condition deteriorates...." Id. at 800; see also Marc Spindelman, Are the
Similarities Between A Woman's Right To Choose an Abortion and the Alleged Right
To Assisted Suicide Really Compelling, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 775 (1996).
14 Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 802. "It is a rational continuum which, broadly
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and pur-
poseless restraints...." Id. at 800. The Ninth Circuit then asserts the "compelling
similarities between right-to-die cases and abortion cases" and "an individual's right
of choice." Id. at 800-01.
75 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1972). The Roe Court stated that it would not
decide the question of when life begins. Id. The Court, however, did assert that
"[w]ith respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the
'compelling' point is at viability." Id. The Court continued that the state could regu-
late abortion and even prohibit abortion after viability because of the state's com-
pelling interest in life. Id. It is curious that the Ninth Circuit would use the abortion
cases, which certainly affirm the state's compelling interest in preserving life of
those already born, as its bedrock for a right to permit one person to help another
kill himself.
76 "[T]he risk to the woman increases as her pregnancy continues. Thus, the
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the Court, in its analysis, did not permit the death of a person.
If, however, an individual were to be successful in asserting and
exercising a liberty interest in suicide, the result would be death
and the state's interest in preserving life would be defeated
completely. Thus, to base a right to assisted suicide on the right
to abortion is misplaced.
Moreover, as a constitutionally guaranteed liberty interest,
the right to abortion extends to every pregnant person,"8 regard-
less of age or other condition. Similarly, it would follow that the
right to assisted suicide would not be limited by age or condition.
Since, for example, a pregnant child has the right to an abor-
tion, 9 a terminally ill child would have the right to physician
assisted suicide. Since a parent cannot forbid a child to have an
abortion," by implication a parent should be unable to forbid a
terminally ill child to obtain medical assistance in committing
suicide.
B. The Balancing Test and the Undue Burden Test
In defining its balancing test, the Ninth Circuit enumerated
the following state interests:8' first, preserving of life; second,
preventing of suicide;' third, avoiding involvement of third par-
ties such as doctors and precluding the use of arbitrary, unfair,
or undue influence on the infirm or elderly to use suicide to re-
duce the stress and cost of extended medical care;' fourth, pre-
venting adverse effects on the children and loved ones of those
State retains a definite interest in protecting the woman's own health and safety
when an abortion is proposed at a late stage of pregnancy." Id. at 150.
77 Id. at 157-58.
Id.; Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992). The Casey Court concluded that the pa-
rental consent provision of the Pennsylvania abortion statute was constitutional,
however, if not given, there were alternatives for a minor:
Except in a medical emergency, an unemancipated young woman under 18
may not obtain an abortion unless she and one of her parents(or guardian)
provides informed consent as defined above. If neither a parent nor a
guardian provides consent, a court may authorize the performance of an
abortion upon a determination that the young woman is mature and capa-
ble of giving informed consent and has in fact given her informed consent,
or that an abortion would be in her best interests.
79 Id. at 899; see supra note 78 and accompanying text for discussion of avail-
ability of abortion to minors.
80 Id.
" Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 790.
82 Id. at 817.
Id. at 820.
Id. at 825.
PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE
who commit suicide;85 fifth, protecting the medical profession
from engaging in conduct that is at odds with their role as heal-
ers;" and finally, the inability to restrict the right to suicide to
the terminally ill and the difficulty in regulating physician as-
sisted suicide. 7 These are well defined, weighty state interests.
In applying the balancing test, however, the Glucksberg court,
chose, on the other side of the scale, to loosely define an individ-
ual's "liberty interest in hastening one's death."8 Despite the
court's express acknowledgment of the difficulty in regulating
physician assisted suicide, the Ninth Circuit opined that a state
can safeguard its interests by enacting proper regulations and
that by implementation of these regulations the "possibility for
error will be remote." 9 Any error, however remote, would be ir-
reversible and result in an innocent person's death. °
Additionally, the Glucksberg court described the terminally
ill as "[p]hysically frail, confined to wheelchairs or beds,"9' and
that their natural deaths will be "protracted, undignified and ex-
tremely painful."92 The court's description, however, is not lim-
ited to the terminally ill. Many people in wheel chairs or in
"intolerable pain"93 are not terminally ill while many terminally
ill patients do not have pain and are not physically confined.
Thus, the dilemma of identifying those entitled to physician as-
sisted suicide is further complicated. Moreover, notably absent
from the court's discussion was whether a person, not in pain,
would be allowed to receive aid in dying.
The Ninth Circuit conceded that physician assisted suicide
Id. at 827.
'6 Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 827.
17 Id. at 830.
8' Id. at 830
'9 Id. at 833.
90 The Ninth Circuit further reassures us that should an error actually oc-
cur it is likely to benefit the [non-terminal/incompetent] individual by
permitting a victim of unmanageable pain and suffering to end his life
peacefully and with dignity at the time he deems most desirable. Would
any American court dare to opine, in the context of a capital punishment
case,that erroneous imposition of the death penalty would benefit the
condemned, by sparing him the miserable existence of life without parole?
Brief of Amici Curiae for the District Attorney of Milwaukee County, Wisconsin , in
Support of Petitioners at *2-3, Washington v. Glucksberg, No. 96-110 (S.Ct. filed
Nov. 12, 1996), 1996 WL 657807.
9' Id. at 832.
92 Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 793.
Id. at 814.
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will lead to voluntary euthanasia.9' The court stated that the
identity of the person who administers the lethal drugs matters
less than the identity of the person choosing to administer
them.95 The court thus opened the door for other courts to find a
liberty interest in allowing mercy killing of the terminally ill, the
infirm, the disabled, and even those who may be physically
healthy and young, but mentally depressed and requesting sui-
cide assistance.
The court further asserted that the prohibition of physician
assisted suicide amounts to "an insuperable obstacle" to the lib-
erty interests of terminally ill "who wish to hasten their deaths
by peaceful means."96 These patients either do not have access to
peaceful means to kill themselves or are unable psychologically
to use violent means.97 An additional burden extends to family
and friends who are called upon to aid illegally in their suicide
attempts.98 The court concluded that abolishing the ban on as-
sisted suicide would alleviate the burden on the individual's lib-
erty interest and solve the problems of the terminally ill. The
court thus seemed to view the terminally ill and their families as
a group distinct from the rest of society. Each person, however,
is ultimately terminal99 and each person is a member of society.
Society is burdened by a law that permits our doctors to be the
designated killers of those who are terminally ill. We must ask
whether there is a liberty interest for persons who want to live in
a society that does not allow doctors, who are supposed to be
healers, to give lethal doses of medication.100 It is suggested that
'4 "We recognize that in some instances, the patient may be unable to self-
administer the drugs and that administration by the physician, or a person acting
under his direction or control, may be the only way the patient may be able to re-
ceive them." Id. at 831.
'5 "We consider it less important who administers the medication than who de-
termines whether the terminally ill person's life shall end." Id. at 832. (Emphasis
added in text).
Id. at 834.
Id. at 834-36.
9' Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 836.
" As Justice Scalia said, during oral arguments of the cases, that "the dying
process of all of us has begun and is underway. It's just a matter of time." Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg, No. 96-110, 1997 WL 13671, at *28 (United States Supreme
Court Official Transcript of Oral Argument Jan. 8, 1997) [hereinafter GLUCKSBERG
ARGUMENTS].
10 AMA Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *26. "[Plhysician-assisted suicide is a
public act with wide-ranging and profound consequences for families, health care
professionals, and society." Id.
PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE
when a person purposely kills himself, the liberty of each of us is
burdened by that loss.-" We must examine the difficulties in
managing the physical and emotional pain of the terminally ill
and why this group may feel that their only alternative is self
destruction.
C. The Historical Analysis
An historical analysis is one method the Court can use to de-
termine if our nation's tradition supports a guaranteed right not
specifically enumerated in the Constitution. 2 The Ninth Circuit
began by stating that for many years abortion and suicide were
prohibited. Today an abortion performed by a physician is legal
and therefore it follows that physician assisted suicide should be
legalized.0 3 This argument is persuasive only if the Court finds
an overbroad liberty interest in an individual's right to choose
anything he desires."0
The Glucksberg court's historical journey began with exam-
ples of suicide in Greek and Roman history, mythology, and lit-
erature. 5 However, it noted if a person who had a criminal
conviction committed suicide, confiscation of his property fol-
lowed as punishment.' °6 Next, the court distorted and reinvented
the history of suicide in Christianity. 17 The Ninth Circuit, for
example, stated "the suicide of Judas Iscariot" after the betrayal
of Christ "is not treated as a further sin, rather as an act of re-
pentance. ""' The Christian churches, however, have always
101 AMA Amicus Brief, supra note 7 at *26.
1o2 Fundamental liberties are those that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's his-
tory and tradition." Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). Recognition
of rights not readily identifiable in the express language of the Constitution depends
on whether they are "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty" so that
"neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed." Palko v. Connecti-
cut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) (citations omitted).
'" Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 804-06.
" o See David Crump, How Do The Courts Really Discover Unenumerated Fun-
damental Rights? Cataloguing the Methods of Judicial Alchemy, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POLY 795, 852-62 (discussing lack of objective criteria in "importance to the
individual" approach in defining fundamental liberty interests).
"' Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 806.
106 Id. at 807.
107 Id. at 808. See Monsignor William Smith, What is Written In The Law? How
Do You Read It? Homily At Red Mass Philadelphia, Pa. October 8, 1996, 37 CATH.
LAW., 73-82 (1996) (noting misinterpretations by judges on religious history of sui-
cide).
108 Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 808 n.25.
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taught that Judas' suicide was not an act of repentance, but an
act of despair because he thought his betrayal was unforgiv-
able.10 9
The court continued by noting that Saint Thomas More, in
his book, Utopia, "strongly supported the right of the terminally
ill to commit suicide and also expressed approval of the practice
of assisting those who wished to hasten their deaths.""0 Utopia,
however as one scholar has recently noted, was a satire and the
person advocating suicide was More's literary foil, named Hyth-
lodaeus, meaning "speaker of nonsense.""'
Judge Beezer's dissent, utilizing the same sources as the
majority,"' found no tradition of suicide or suicide assistance in
our nation's history. Interestingly, the Second Circuit, in Vacco
v. Quill, stated that "the right to assisted suicide claimed by
plaintiffs is" not "deeply rooted in the nation's traditions and
history. Indeed, the very opposite is true." 3
Finally, the Glucksberg court stated that "no state" today
"has a statute prohibiting suicide" but that a majority of states
have laws against assisting another person to commit suicide."'
The court quoted several studies and polls that showed societal
support for physician assisted suicide and declared that physi-
cian assisted suicide was a "time-honored but hidden practice of
physicians helping terminally ill patients to hasten their
deaths.""' The American Medical Society vehemently disputed
this assertion."' Moreover, logic dictates that if the medical pro-
109 Id. at 808 n.25; see Msgr. Smith, supra note 107, at 76; Thomas J. Marzen,
Assisted Suicide What's At Stake, COLUMBIA, January 1997, at 12.
"' Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 808.
... Msgr. Smith, supra note 107, at 77 (pointing out Ninth Circuit apparently
missed More's intended pun).
' Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 845. The majority in Glucksberg quotes portions of
the work of Thomas Marzen on the history of suicide in western society. Thomas
Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 17-100 (1985).
Using this same source Judge Beezer, in his dissent, fills in the majority's omissions
and finds that suicide is now seen as an "indicum of mental illness... .The modern
consensus consists of an overall disapproval of suicide which is manifested through
... treating [suicide] as a medical or psychological problem" while retaining "criminal
statutes prohibiting the aiding or assisting of suicide." Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 847
(Beezer, J., dissenting).
11 Vacco v. Quill, 80 F.3d 716, 724 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36
(1996).
114 Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 810.
Id. at 811.
116 "The notion that everybody looks the other way while physicians eliminate
the terminally ill patients was flatly denied in briefs to the Supreme Court by the
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fession currently ignores prohibitions against doctor assisted
suicide, society should have no expectations that doctors will
obey a new set of regulations concerning assisted suicide."7
Clearly, that the court's limited and distorted historical interpre-
tation should not be a basis upon which to find a new constitu-
tional right nor should an alleged illegal, hidden practice be
transformed into a constitutional right because several surveys
detect a change in societal attitudes."' If there truly is societal
support for physician assisted suicide, the state legislatures are
the proper places to debate the issue and to determine whether
to retain the prohibition on assisted suicide.
D. Cruzan: The Refusal of Medical Treatment Equals Suicide
The Ninth Circuit recognized no difference between refusing
life sustaining treatment and physician assisted suicide when
the result of each was the death of a person."9 The right to ref-
use medical treatment, however, is not limited to the terminally
ill. 20 Each of us can refuse to take a prescription given by a doc-
tor, continue smoking or eating fatty foods against a doctor's ad-
vice, refuse to have an operation, refuse chemotherapy deemed
necessary for survival, or discontinue kidney dialysis. We do this
simply by refusing the treatment, seeking another opinion until
American Medical Association, the Medical Society of New Jersey, the American
Geriatric Association and numerous other members of the medical community." Carl
Restivo, M.D., Not Everybody Knows, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1997, at A16. But see
Anthony L. Beck et al., Physician Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Washington
State Patient Requests and Physician Responses, 12 JAMA 919 (1996) (discussing
frequency of patient requests and physician compliance with suicide assistance).
117 See Yale Kamisar, The Reasons So Many People Support Physician-Assisted
Suicide-And Why These Reasons Are Not Convincing, 12 ISSUES L. & MED. 113,
119-120 (Fall, 1996) (noting physician's aren't convicted under present statutes for
assisting patients to die, therefore, no reasons exist to believe new laws would alter
current practices).
"' An example of societal support for physician assisted suicide can be inferred
from the refusal of grand juries to indict physicians who have admitted to assisting
patients in committing suicide. See Robert J. Brendon et al., Should Physicians Aid
Their Patients in Dying?, 267 JAMA 2658, 2658 (1992).
9 "[Tihe common law doctrine of informed consent is viewed as generally en-
compassing the right of a competent individual to refuse medical treatment." Cru-
zan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990).
120 "Justice Cardozo, while on the Court of Appeals of New York, aptly described
this doctrine: 'Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to de-
termine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an op-
eration without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in
damages.'" Id. at 269 (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y.
125, 129-30 (1914)).
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finding a doctor who will do what we like, or believing that we
are not sick. Refusal of medical treatment is a common law right
that extends to all persons."' The Ninth Circuit based the right
to refuse medical treatment in the liberty interest expressed in
Casey as part of choosing one's personal existence. 122 The Court
in Cruzan, however, found that the common law granted the
right to refuse unwanted bodily invasion and to deny consent to
medical treatment.
2 3
E. The "Slippery Slope"Argument
Defining terminal illness is difficult.' Doctors provide an
estimated life expectancy for patients and their families but
there is no absolute certainty of death's exact time short of an
affirmative act of suicide.' The Ninth and Second Circuits
avoided the issue by leaving that decision to the states.
There are also terminally ill patients too weak or debilitated
to take doctor prescribed medicine so that another individual
must be called upon to administer the lethal dose. 6 This act is
more properly termed euthanasia than physician assisted sui-
cide. 7
121 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269-70.
122 Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 804-06; see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
121 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269-70.
12 See Brief of Amici Curiae for Choice In Dying in Support of Neither Petition-
ers nor Respondents at *12-13, Quill v. Vacco, No. 95-1858 (S. Ct. filed Nov. 12,
1996), Washington v. Glucksberg, No. 96-110 (S.Ct. filed Nov. 12, 1996) 1996 WL
656277 [hereinafter Choice In Dying Amicus Brief] (stating "there is a lack of con-
sensus as to definitions of terminal illness."). The examples are numerous: New
York uses one year until death, New Jersey uses six months, California uses a
"relatively short time" and Illinois uses "where death is imminent." Id. However,
the Glucksberg court stated that defining the term is not free from difficulty yet as-
serted that states can define it with a definite period of time or an indefinite period
and can include persons in a permanently unconscious state. Glucksberg, 79 F.3d
at 831. The court continued that this is not a legitimate reason for refusing to rec-
ognize a liberty interest in hastening one's death. Id. The Quill court declared that
physicians "agree on the definition of 'terminally ill.' ... Physicians are accustomed
to advising patients and their families in this regard...." Quill, 80 F.3d at 731.
"2 See Brief of Amicus Curiae for the National Hospice Organization in Support
of Petitioners at * 13-16, Quill v. Vacco, No. 95-1858 (S. Ct. filed Nov. 12, 1996),
Washington v. Glucksberg, No. 96-110 (S.Ct. filed Nov. 12, 1996) 1996 WL 656338
[hereinafter Hospice Amicus Brief (discussing difficulties of physicians determining
time until death of their patients).
126 The Ninth Circuit called this "physician-aid-in-dying." Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at
832 n.119.
12' Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 840 (Beezer, J., dissenting) (stating "[eluthanasia oc-
curs when the physician actually administers the agent which causes death."). See
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Restricting a constitutionally guaranteed right to a particu-
lar group seemingly would be an unconstitutional denial of equal
protection. Thus, a physically well but mentally and emotionally
depressed person who wants to die should be permitted to claim
the same right to physician assisted suicide as a physically ill
person unless the Court makes a subjective determination that
physical suffering is worse than mental suffering."8
If, as the Ninth Circuit decided, there is no difference be-
tween refusal of treatment, which is not limited to a particular
group, and assisted suicide, it seems unreasonable to limit as-
sisted suicide to the terminally ill adult.9 A child, for example,
in excruciating pain from a terminal disease should not have to
suffer while an adult would be relieved of pain after ingesting a
prescribed lethal dose of medication. This raises the further
problem of who - the court, the parent, the child, or the doctor-
would decide to allow suicide in the case of a terminally ill child
in agonizing pain. The Casey Court declared that the state may
require a child to have the consent of a parent or guardian to
have an abortion, but if neither provides consent then a court
may allow the minor to consent or determine that "an abortion
would be in her best interests."3 ° A Supreme Court decision al-
lowing assisted suicide that rests on the same liberty interest
that allows a minor to choose abortion without parental consent
seemingly should allow a minor to choose death without parental
consent after a similar judicial inquiry.
An additional problem arises with regard to progressive,
long term, debilitating diseases that cause a patient great physi-
TASK FORCE, WHEN DEATH Is SOUGHT, supra note 7, at 1 and accompanying defini-
tions of assisted suicide and euthanasia.
'28 "No sound scientific or clinical basis exists for distinguishing suicidal pa-
tients with terminal conditions from other suicidal patients." Brief of Amicus Cu-
riae for the American Suicide Foundation, in Support of Petitioners at * 3, Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg, No. 96-110 (S. Ct. filed Nov. 12, 1996), 1996 WL 665436
[hereinafter Suicide Amicus Brief] (presenting detailed clinical analysis of suicidal
patients). Justice Scalia asked the lawyer for Glucksberg "what about the patient
who has terrible emotional suffering in life and just says life is not worth it any-
more? ... the government makes the judgment that physical pain is worse than emo-
tional suffering?" GLUCKSBERG ARGUMENTS, supra note 99 at *31-32.
129 "[Tlhe Constitution encompasses a due process liberty interest in controlling
the time and manner of one's death ... a constitutionally recognized 'right to die.'
Our conclusion is strongly influenced by, but not limited to, the plight of the men-
tally competent, terminally ill adults." Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 816 (emphasis added).
"' Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see supra note 78 and accompanying text for dis-
cussion of minor's right to abortion.
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cal pain and physical confinement but do not cause death for
many years. It would seem that, if there is a fundamental right
to physician assisted suicide, these patients have a heightened
right to prevent what the Ninth Circuit termed "painful, pro-
tracted, and agonizing deaths"' and "remaining days [that] are
unmitigated torture."'32 Indeed the Ninth Circuit declared in its
decision that "[ojur conclusion is ... not limited to the plight of
mentally competent, terminally ill adults. We are influenced ...
by ... those whose existence is reduced to a vegetative state or a
permanent and irreversible state of unconsciousness.' 33
These "slippery slope" arguments are significant. Although
the Ninth Circuit declared that the magnitude of the liberty in-
terest and the countervailing state's interest vary, '34 finding a
constitutionally guaranteed right to assisted suicide may lead
only to controversies for society and the terminally ill and result
in endless cases for the courts.
3 1
II. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion guarantees that a state will not deny to any person "the
equal protection of its laws."3 6 The state may not make any
classification that gives favorable treatment to one group while
denying the same treatment to others.'3 ' Even if the express
words of a state regulation are non-discriminatory, the statute is
unconstitutional if applied in a discriminatory manner.' 38 Gen-
erally this means that all persons similarly situated must receive
equal treatment from the state government. 39  The Supreme
Court of the United States recognizes three levels of scrutiny in
... Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 839.
132 Id. at 834.
'3 Id. at 816.
" Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 836.
... See generally David France, This Doctor Wants To Help You Die, NEW YORK,
Jan. 13, 1997, at 25 (noting debates on circumstances and methods of performing
assisted suicides will ensure a right to suicide is found).
"' "[Nior" shall any State "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XJV, § 1.
137 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (stating "[tihe Equal Protection
Clause directs that 'all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."').
"' Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (invalidating local ordinance that
government enforced against 'subjects of China' but not other persons as unconsti-
tutional denial of equal protection of law).
1'9 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 261.
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examining the validity of classifications." ' Strict scrutiny, the
highest level, requires the state to show that its regulation is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest."' Strict scru-
tiny applies only when the classification interferes with a fun-
damental right"" or disadvantages a suspect class."13 The Court
has limited suspect classes to race'" and national origin.1' The
middle level of scrutiny, which applies to classes involving gen-
der 146 or illegitimacy, 147 necessitates that the regulation be sub-
stantially related to an important state interest."8 Rational ba-
sis review, applied to ordinary social and economic legislation,
requires only that the regulation be rationally related to the
state's interest."19  But if the economic or social legislation also
involves a "fundamental right," strict scrutiny applies.5 ° The
Supreme Court has restricted fundamental rights outside of the
ones specifically mentioned in the Constitution to a very few: the
40 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-42 (1985) (delineating
three levels of scrutiny for Equal Protection Analysis).
1 Id. at 440.
142 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973) (defining
fundamental rights as "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.").
1 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976)
(recognizing that strict scrutiny applies to fundamental rights and suspect classifi-
cations); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 16 (same).
14 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (finding unconstitutional law
forbidding blacks from serving on juries).
1 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding local ordinance unconstitu-
tional because it discriminated on basis of national origin).
14 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (finding relationship of gender to traffic
safety too tenuous for gender-based difference in treatment to be substantially re-
lated to state interest); Frontero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (indicating
that "sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contrib-
ute to society.").
147 New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973) (finding
that benefits extended to legitimate children would be just as beneficial to illegiti-
mate children and Equal Protection Clause demands both receive them).
'" Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 440 (1985) (indicating that
Equal Protection Clause imposes less stringent standard on social or economic legis-
lation); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1987) (giving standard applied for inter-
mediate scrutiny); see Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24
(1982) (noting intermediate scrutiny standard and that standard also applies to
gender discrimination against males).
149 "The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sus-
tained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985).
"5 Id. (stating that when legislation involves social or economic issues, states
have tremendous latitude).
37 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 3
right to interstate travel, 5' the right to vote,"' the right to court
access in a criminal case, 53 the right to marry," and the right to
use contraception.'55 As a practical matter, if a right is funda-
mental the government should not interfere with the exercise of
that right. Therefore, if the Supreme Court extends fundamen-
tal constitutional rights to include the right to take one's life,
states will be prohibited from regulating that right.
In Vacco v. Quill, the Second Circuit found that there was no
fundamental constitutionally protected right to physician as-
sisted suicide,5 6 and also declined to classify the terminally ill as
a suspect or quasi-suspect class.'57 The court, however, applied
only a rational relationship test to the New York statutes prohib-
iting physician assisted suicide' 5 and found, nevertheless, that
the laws lacked any rational basis.'59 The court asserted that the
state denied "the equal protection of the law" because terminally
ill patients had no "right to choose to hasten inevitable death,
while terminally ill persons whose treatment includes life sup-
' ' Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (finding interstate travel is fun-
damental right, therefore regulation is subject to strict scrutiny); United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966) ("[Flreedom to travel throughout the United States
has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution."); Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908) (recognizing that right to travel interstate is among
rights and privileges of national citizenship).
152 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (finding long residency requirement
as prerequisite to voting fails strict scrutiny); Evans v. Corman, 398 U.S. 419, 422
(1970) (recognizing right to vote as fundamental).
153 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974) (stating that right to court ac-
cess is fundamental right); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (finding state
must appoint counsel for indigent as matter of right after criminal conviction).
15 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (finding right to marry was funda-
mental right); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("marriage [is] fun-
damental to the very existence and survival of the [human] race.").
" Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding fundamental right of
married couples to use contraception in constitutional right to privacy).
"'6 Quill, 80 F.3d at 724-25.
15, Id. at 726-27.
Id. at 726. The state's interest in the protection of the lives of its citizens,
however, would seem to be completely rational. The difficulty in determining who is
terminally ill and if that person truly wishes to commit suicide or is just depressed,
is fraught with ambiguity and difficulty. Therefore, a complete ban on assisted sui-
cide solely on the ambiguity issue seems rational. See supra note 124 for discussion
of difficulty in determining class of "the terminally ill."
"9 The Second Circuit stated that, "[To the extent that the statutes in question
prohibit persons in the final stages of terminal illness from having assistance in
ending their lives by the use of self-administered, prescribed drugs, the statutes
lack any rational basis and are violative of the Equal Protection Clause." Quill, 80
F.3d at 727.
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port are able to exercise this choice with necessary medical assis-
tance by directing termination of such treatment."6 ' The Second
Circuit thereby equated a patient's choice to terminate life-
sustaining treatment, including artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion, with a patient's request for a doctor's affirmative act of pre-
scribing a lethal medication.
The Second Circuit misinterpreted some very important
principles: first, the state's reason for allowing advance care di-
rectives; second, the application to all persons, not a select class,
of the right to refuse medical treatment and the prohibition
against assisting another to commit suicide; third, the legal ba-
sis for the right to refuse medical treatment; and lastly, the doc-
tor's intentions while treating the patient and the patient's in-
tentions in choosing or refusing medical treatment.
A. Advance Care Directives
The court looked to New York State laws which allow a per-
son to make an advance directive not to resuscitate him in the
event of cardiac or respiratory arrest,"' to appoint a health care
proxy to make medical decisions in the event of his incapacity,
16 2
and to write a living will specifically detailing the type of care to
be provided if he becomes incapacitated in the future. 13  These
160 Id. at 729.
'16 Id. at 727 (citing "Article 29-B of the New York Public Health Law, entitled
"Orders Not to Resuscitate." N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2964 (McKimnney 1987)).
Cardiopulmonary resuscitation is defined as "measures ... to restore cardiac func-
tion or to support ventilation in the event of cardiac or respiratory arrest."). Id. §
2964. For a full discussion of the topic see NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE
AND THE LAW: Do NOT RESUSCITATE ORDERS (1986) [hereinafter TASK FORCE DNRI.
162 Quill, 80 F.3d at 728 (citing Article 29-C of the Public Health Law, entitled
"Health Care Agents and Proxies"). N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2964 (McKinney
1987). "This statute allows for a person to sign a health care proxy ... for the pur-
pose of appointing an agent with authority to make any and all health care decisions
on the principal's behalf that the principal could make." Quill, 80 F.3d at 728. Since
the decision making power includes the right to refuse life-sustaining nutrition and
hydration the Second Circuit concluded that this empowers a person to commit sui-
cide. Id. But see NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN
OTHERS MUST CHOOSE: DECIDING FOR PATIENTS WITHOUT CAPACITY, 23-45 (1992)
[hereinafter TASK FORCE, OTHERS MUST CHOOSE] (contending that signing of health
care proxy does not empower one to commit suicide).
163 New York does not have a statutory scheme for living wills but the Court of
Appeals in several cases stated that written and oral evidence demonstrating by
clear and convincing evidence the wishes of the incompetent person before he be-
came incompetent is sufficient to allow another to make decisions that the incompe-
tent person would have made for himself. See In re Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 379
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are all choices that a person can make about his care in case of a
terminal or severely debilitating illness.'" The Second Circuit,
however, did not affirm these as choices allowing a person to
control his care but rather labeled these choices as equivalent to
self-destruction. 
165
B. Definition of the Class of Persons Treated Unequally
The right to refuse medical treatment applies to all persons
whether healthy or terminally ill.166 The prohibition against as-
sisting another to commit suicide also applies to all persons. 67
Although the relevant statutes actually applied equally to every-
one in the state, the Second Circuit as well as the Ninth Circuit
fashioned 'artificial' classifications. These courts created a class
called 'the terminally ill' and then subdivided it into those who
receive artificial life-sustaining treatment and those who do not.
After establishing the class, the Ninth Circuit, nevertheless, con-
ceded that it is difficult to define precisely the terminally ill.'
The Second Circuit deferred to doctors who, through their expe-
(N.Y.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981) (applying clear and convincing standard
where incompetent person left instructions while competent to terminate life-
sustaining procedures); In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531
(N.Y. 1988) (noting that where patient creates living will while competent, this pro-
vides court with evidence of patient's wishes).
'64 See generally TASK FORCE, OTHERS MUST CHOOSE, supra note 162, at 23-45
(discussing available alternatives in cases of terminal illness); TASK FORCE DNR,
supra note 161; NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH
(1986).
165 "By ordering the discontinuance of these artificial life-sustaining processes or
refusing to accept them in the first place, a patient hastens his death by means that
are not natural in any sense." Quill, 80 F.3d at 729; see Note, Physician Assisted
Suicide and the Right to Die With Assistance, 105 HARV. L. REV. 2021, 2028-31
(1992) (criticizing action-inaction distinction between physician assisted suicide and
refusal or withdrawal of treatment).
166 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (citing
Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30 (1914) (stating that
"[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body.").
167 "A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes
or aids another person to attempt suicide." WASH. REV. CODE 9A, 36.060 (West
1988) (emphasis added). "A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he
intentionally causes or aids another person to attempt suicide." N.Y. PENAL LAW §
120.30 (McKinney 1987) (emphasis added). "A person is guilty of manslaughter in
the second degree when he ... intentionally causes or aids another person to commit
suicide." Id. § 125.15 (emphasis added).
168 Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 831. See supra note 124 for discussion of definition of
terminally ill.
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rience, know when a patient is terminally ill."9 Doctors, how-
ever, are notoriously wrong in their predictions about how long a
particular patient will live. 7° Thus there is difficulty in identify-
ing the class. 7'
C. The Right To Refuse Medical Treatment
The medical profession and the law both require physicians
to consider the patient's wishes about his own care. 7 ' In Vacco
v. Quill, the Second Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Cruzan 173 to assert its notion that refusal of medical
treatment was indistinguishable from physician assisted sui-
cide.'74 The Court in Cruzan, however, found that the right to re-
fuse medical treatment rested on the common law right not to be
touched by another without consent, the common law notion of
informed consent for medical treatment, and a liberty interest."'
The Cruzan Court reasoned that the right to informed consent
included the right to withhold consent. A doctor cannot compel
his patient to continue chemotherapy if the patient chooses to
discontinue treatment. If the patient wants to discontinue arti-
ficial nutrition and hydration the doctor must abide by his
wishes. When a doctor withdraws artificial life support, how-
ever, his intent is to provide the care requested by the patient,
not to kill him. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit determined
that the ending of life in this manner would constitute assisted
1'9 Quill, 80 F.3d. at 731 (commenting that physicians generally agree on defini-
tion of "terminally ill").
170 The American Medical Association, the professional organization of American
physicians, declares that there is difficulty in determining who are the terminally
ill. A"A Amicus Brief, supra note 7 at *12. It is perplexing to give people a right to
assisted suicide when the doctors who are assisting are not sure who is entitled to
the help.
171 Id. at *270.
172 "The right to control one's medical treatment is among the most important
rights that the law affords each person." AMA Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *1.
Further, medical treatment done without the patient's permission has been treated
by law as battery. Id. at *20.
173 Quill, 80 F.3d at 728-29 (discussing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health,
497 U.S. 261 (1990)).
114 By ordering the discontinuance of these artificial life-sustaining proc-
esses or by refusing to accept them in the first place, a patient hastens his
death by means that are not natural in any sense. It certainly cannot be
said that the death that immediately ensues is the natural result of the
progression of the disease or condition from which the patient suffers.
Quill, 80 F.3d at 729.
171 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269-70.
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suicide. The reasoning of the Second Circuit, taken to its logical
conclusion, means that anytime a physician terminates artificial
life-sustaining treatment or a patient refuses the treatments, it
would be assisted suicide. This inevitably leads to the illogical
conclusion that a patient, unable to be revived by cardiopulmon-
ary resuscitation, would nevertheless require continuous resusci-
tation to avoid death. Otherwise, his death would be considered
physician assisted suicide. Similarly, when a family with a doc-
tor's support decides to care for a terminally ill child at home in-
stead of treating him with artificial nutrition and hydration in
an acute care facility, possibly shortening the child's life and
pain by a few days, the court could conclude that the family as-
sisted the child in committing suicide. It is important to recog-
nize that refusing medical treatment is a permissible option es-
pecially because medical techniques can become invasive and
abusive to a person's body. A patient may decide, at anytime
during medical treatment, that he wants to be alive and at
peace detached from tubes and machines.
D. The Intention of the Parties: Doctor and Patient
The courts incorrectly decided that the intention of the doc-
tor did not matter.176 It is significant to note that "physician as-
sisted suicide always involves an intent to terminate a life, while
forgoing medical treatment does not."77 In criminal law, the
mens rea of a crime is essential.'78 If a person intends to kill and
thus causes another's death, his actions and intention taken to-
gether will amount to some degree of homocide.'79
Treatment by a physician, however, can have a "double ef-
fect." 8° While trying to cure a patient of cancer through aggres-
176 Brief of Amici Curiae for the Catholic Medical Association in Support of Pe-
titioners, at *6, Vacco v. Quill, No. 95-1858 (S. Ct. filed Nov. 12, 1996), Washington
v. Glucksberg, No. 96-110 (S. Ct. filed Nov. 12, 1996) 1996 WL 656339 [hereinafter
CMA Amicus Brief] (noting that Second and Ninth Circuits erred "because assisted
suicide, by definition, involves an intent to kill.").
171 See CMA Amicus Brief, supra note 176, at *19 (discussing difference between
physician assisted suicide and foregoing treatment).
178 See CMA Amicus Brief, supra note 176, at *19-20 (noting that mens rea is
essential element of crime).
" CMA Amicus Brief, supra note 176, at *19-20; TASK FORCE, WHEN DEATH IS
SOUGHT, supra note 7, at 55-67 (analyzing New York Penal Law on assisted suicide).
"" See Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 823 n.94 (describing 'double effect' as giving medi-
cation to terminally ill patient to relieve pain that may have effect of shortening pa-
tient's life).
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sive chemotherapy the patient can become debilitated and ulti-
mately die from the side effects of chemotherapy. Yet, the on-
cologist, a cancer specialist, would not be guilty of murder; his
intent was to cure the patient. 8' In relieving pain for the termi-
nally ill, a doctor prescribes medication that depresses respira-
tion and blood pressure and brings on death sooner than would
have occurred without the medication."2 The intention, however,
of the doctor is to relieve pain, not to kill the patient.' Simi-
larly, a doctor's decision to remove artificial nutrition and hy-
dration may be to relieve the patient of the undue burden of
dealing with a painful treatment and does not reflect the doctor's
intent to kill the person.'" Despite evidence to the contrary, the
Ninth Circuit emphatically denies the intent distinction of this
"double effect" and asserts that a physician intends a patient's
death when he removes artificial life support or prescribes large
doses of morphine to control pain. 8 '
The controversy surrounding the refusal of additional life-
sustaining treatment is a multi-faceted one requiring a consid-
eration of numerous factors.8 6 First, the terminal patient who
wants to survive but does not want more extensive and painful
treatment, 11 7 may instead of viewing artificial hydration and nu-
trition as life-sustaining, consider them obstacles to a natural
181 See AMA Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *28 (stating that provision of treat-
ment, even if intended to heal, could have a fatal effect).
182 See TASK FORCE, WHEN DEATH Is SOUGHT, supra note 7, at 163-65
(discussing the principle of 'double effect' in relation to the administration of opioids,
a primary form of pain relief for those in severe pain). The Task Force recognizes
that there is a difference of opinion on the element of 'double effect' but all agree
that "intentions can be a significant and decisive factor in evaluating actions." Id. at
164. See also Choice In Dying Amicus Brief, supra note 124, at *11 (noting that
'double effect' is "morally acceptable risk").
' "ITlhe provision of pain medication is medically and professionally acceptable
even when such treatment may hasten death, if the medication is intended to alle-
viate pain and severe discomfort, not to cause death." TASK FORCE, WHEN DEATH IS
SOUGHT, supra note 7, at 162.
'" See CMA Amicus Brief, supra note 176, at *21 (stating that "[miedical science
can offer numerous [other] examples in which the decision to forego medical treat-
ment does not involve an intent to kill or die.")
115 Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 823-24.
'8' "[Pleople who refuse life-sustaining medical treatment may not harbor a
specific intent to die; rather they may fervently wish to live, but to do so free of un-
wanted medical technology, surgery, or drugs, and without protracted suffering."
Brief of Amici Curiae For The Medical Society of New Jersey In Support of Petition-
ers, at *13, Vacco v. Quill, No. 95-1858 (S. Ct. filed Nov. 12, 1996) 1996 WL 656348
[hereinafter NJ Med Amicus Brief].
117 NJ Med Amicus Brief, supra note 186, at *13.
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death.8 ' Most cancer patients, for example, near the end of life
are not interested in food or capable of eating. 9 Feeding these
patients artificially may only burden them.9 ° Yet, removal of a
feeding tube is not the cause of death because the individual ul-
timately dies from destruction of their bodies by cancer. Death
in this manner is different from that caused by ingestion of le-
thal medication where the person ultimately dies from self-
inflicted poisoning.'
A second factor to consider is that the removal of life-
sustaining treatment may not bring about death. In the famous
case of Karen Ann Quinlan, a long court battle ended when the
court granted permission for removal of a respirator that was
keeping Ms. Quinlan alive in a persistent vegetative state.'92
Doctors predicted that Ms. Quinlan's death would follow soon af-
ter removal of the respirator.'93 Nevertheless, after the respira-
tor was removed, Ms. Quinlan lived for years in that same per-
sistent vegetative state. 194 Thus, the facts of the Quinlan case
seemingly contradict the Second Circuit's position that physi-
cians do not become killers "by prescribing drugs to hasten death
any more than they do by disconnecting life-support systems."95
If Karen Ann Quinlan's doctors had given her a lethal dose of
medication, based on their belief that her death was imminent
she would have died years before she actually did.
A final factor is that the decision to cease artificial nutrition,
unlike the decisions to commit suicide with the assistance of a
188 "These life-sustaining treatments artificially postpone natural death, and the
withholding or withdrawing of these treatments removes the obstacle." Choice In
DyinF Amicus Brief, supra note 124, at *9. Id.
19 Choice in Dying Amicus Brief, supra note 124 at *9 n.20 (stating that treat-
ments such as artificial nutrition and hydration in patients with diseases like cancer
may only serve to prolong their pain and suffering so that they "survive into a more
advanced and debilitating stage of the disease.").
190 See Choice In Dying Amicus Brief, supra note 124, at *8-10 (noting that "[the
imposition of artificial nutrition and hydration may actually contribute to an uncom-
fortable death.").
"' NJ Med Amicus Brief, supra note 186, at *13 (stating that "[riefusing medical
intervention merely allows the disease to take its natural course; if death were
eventually to occur, it would be the result, primarily, of the underlying disease, and
not the result of self-inflicted injury.").
'92 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 671 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1976), cert. denied sub nom.,
Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
193 Id. at 655.
'94 It should be noted, however, that Karen Ann Quinlan continued to receive
artificial nutrition and hydration during those years.
'9' Quill, 80 F.3d at 730.
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physician, is not final. A patient may change his mind and re-
sume whatever treatment had been stopped previously. How-
ever, death by assisted suicide is final and does not allow a
change of heart. As such, it creates a definite risk of
"irreversible error."196 The aforementioned distinctions between
refusal or termination of life-sustaining treatment and assisted
suicide certainly are rational and should be relied upon by the
Supreme Court in upholding the state prohibition of assisted
suicide.
III. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
While this Comment is primarily an analysis of the Ninth
and Second Circuit decisions regarding physician assisted sui-
cide, certain public policy issues surrounding this debate are in-
tegral to the discussion and thus are examined below.
First, trust is the basis of the doctor patient relationship.'97
Patients rely on their doctors to administer proper care and to
advise them of the most effective means of controlling their ill-
nesses.'98 Viewed in this context, a doctor's suggestion of as-
sisted suicide may be misconstrued and thus improperly influ-
ence a patient's decision to pursue a course he otherwise may not
have taken. Because they are trained to be healers,'99 doctors,
faced with a patient's impending death, may experience feelings
of failure and inadequacy. °° Under these circumstances, a doc-
16 See Brief of Amici Curiae For the American Association of Homes and Serv-
ices for the Aging, et al. In Support of Petitioners at *13, Vacco v. Quill, No. 95-1858
(S. Ct. filed Nov. 12, 1996), Washington v. Glucksberg, No. 96-110 (S. Ct. filed Nov.
12, 1996) 1996 WL 656324 [hereinafter Homes For Aging Amicus Brief] (recognizing
that patient's decision to commit suicide may be made while patient is incompetent
and thus incapable of voluntary agreement).
... The American Medical Society stated that "Itihe ban on physician-assisted
suicide helps ensure that patients will never lose the trust that must exist for the
relationships between health care professionals and patients to flourish." AMA Ami-
cus Brief, supra note 7, at *29.
'9' See AMA Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *3 ("Patients come to physicians at
times of greatest need.").
'" AMA Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *1-3.
296 AMA Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *16. "Health care professionals also ex-
perience great frustration at not being able to offer the patient a cure." Id. This
frustration is indicative of the physician's "inability to tolerate the situation they
cannot control." Herbert Hendin, M.D., Seduced by Death: Doctors, Patients and the
Dutch Cure, 10 ISSuES L. & MED. 123, 129 (1994). Thus, many doctors may perceive
assisted suicide as a means of regaining some control over the patient's illness. "By
deciding when patients die, by making death a Medicare decision, the physician has
the illusion of mastery over the disease and the accompanying feelings of helpless-
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tor may regard offering a lethal prescription to a patient as con-
quering the disease rather than letting the illness conquer the
patient.201 Since communication between doctors and patients is
limited and especially difficult when there is no cure for the dis-
ease,2 °2 suicide may give the doctors a feeling of empowerment.2 3
Such a perception on the part of the physician may lead them to
prescribe assisted suicide as a positive course of treatment.2°
Patients, relying on the physician's assessment, may feel com-
pelled to choose suicide rather than exploring other viable op-
tions including living long enough to be cured of the illness.06
Second, in recent years the cost of health care in the United
States has skyrocketed and our health care system is moving
rapidly into a system of managed care that provides doctors with
business-like financial incentives to reduce costs by refusing to
treat patients.2°6 Specifically, doctors who limit costs receive a
personal financial bonus.0 7 Thus, when deciding whether to
treat a terminally ill patient aggressively with an expensive pro-
cedure, such as chemotherapy, or to suggest relatively less costly
assisted suicide, a doctor may present the assisted suicide as a
much more appealing option thereby unduly influencing a pa-
tient's decision to choose death rather than life."8 In the United
ness." Id. See also TASK FORCE, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT, supra note 7, at 123
(acknowledging that "offering assisted suicide ... may reflect physicians' own frus-
tration in situations when medicine can provide care but not cure.").
20' AMA Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *16.
202 Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 826-27.
203 AMA Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *16 (quoting Hendin, Seduced by Death,
10 ISSuEs IN L. & MED. 123, 129) (1994)).
204 "Transforming physician-assisted suicide into a medical procedure would
create momentum in favor or its use that regulation could not reverse." AMA Ami-
cus Brief, supra note 7, at *18.
20 The American Medical Society believes that if physician assisted suicide is
legalized there will be tremendous pressure upon patients to justify why they don't
want to kill themselves when they have a serious illness. The pressure would come
from the feelings of being a financial and emotional burden on their families. Pa-
tients, moreover, would feel that they were responsible for their own suffering.
AMA Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *17.
206 Brief of Amici Curiae For International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force In Sup-
port of Petitioners at *5-11, Vacco v. Quill, No. 95-1858 (S. Ct. filed Nov. 12, 1996),
Washington v. Glucksberg, No. 96-110 (S. Ct. filed Nov. 12, 1996) 1996 WL 656322
[hereinafter Int'l Task Force Amicus Brief] (noting that "health care providers are
encouraged by a myriad of incentives and disincentives to control costs by limiting
treatment and care.").
20 Int'l Task Force Amicus Brief, supra note 206, at *5.
208 'At a time when managed care cost containment provisions make even emer-
gency care difficult to obtain, it would be incredibly naive to assume that the same
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States, where no system of national health care exists, assisted
suicide may emerge as the best option for those people without
medical insurance or alternative financial resources. 0 9 Others,
capable of paying for care, may still choose suicide in an effort to
ease the financial and emotional burdens on their families.210
Third, some proponents of assisted suicide try to paint any
opposition to it as a religious argument 21' and any prohibition of
it in the law as an establishment of religion in violation of the
First Amendment.212 Although some view suicide as contrary to
religious teaching, there is no automatic constitutional violation
when religious teaching and the law coincide as they often do.2"'
Despite the contentions of its proponents, opposition to assisted
suicide is firmly rooted in the state's vital interest in preserving
the life of its citizens. While the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the
legitimacy of the state's interest, they considered it to be out-
weighed by one's liberty interest in choosing how and when one
dies. The Ninth Circuit regarded the state's interest in preserv-
managed care programs would authorize access to all medical options, some of
which may be expensive, before approving the cost of effective treatment of assisted
suicide." Int'l Task Force Amicus Brief, supra note 206, at *15; "Health care insurers
would consciously seek to avoid suggesting to patients or physicians that they con-
sider financial costs in making decisions to hasten death, the continuing pressure to
reduce costs can only constrain the availability and quality of palliative care and
support services that patients and families need." AMA Amicus Brief supra note 7,
at *13-14.
209 AMA Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *13 (stating that "poor and minority in-
dividuals are at the greatest risk for receiving inadequate care and thus may feel
the greatest pressure to request physician assisted suicide.").
10 "One of the most common reasons why patients request suicide is to spare
their families and loved ones the burdens and expense of caring for them." AMA
Amicus Brief supra note 7, at *14.
21' Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 839. The court declared that persons are not free to
"force their religious convictions" on all members of society and thereby force "those
whose values differ with theirs to die painful, protracted, and agonizing deaths." Id.
See GLUCKSBERG ARGUMENTS, supra note 99 at *49. "Ms. Tucker" [for petitioners]
said "that this decision is so profoundly personal, so intimate to the individual, so
much based on their own values and beliefs and perhaps religious beliefs . Id.
But see Kamisar, supra note 117, at 118-19 (rejecting contention of proponents that
reasons of those opposing assisted suicide are strictly religious and can only be de-
fended on religious grounds).
212 U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Id.
211 It is suggested that religion and the law agree that murder, robbery, and
rape are wrong. Justice Kennedy said at oral arguments of the cases that "[w]hy
can't a society determine as a matter of public morality that it is wrong to kill your-
self just as it is wrong to kill someone else." GLUCKSBERG ARGUMENTS, supra note
99, at *48.
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ing the life of a person who is terminally ill as "dramatically di-
minished" while at the same time admitting that it is difficult to
determine who is terminally ill. 14 Contrary to the court's reason-
ing, it seems that the state's interest in preserving the life of its
citizens should reach its pinnacle when people are sick and vul-
nerable rather than when they are healthy and able to care for
themselves.215 Furthermore, the court's inability to ascertain de-
finitively who are the terminally ill will lead society to question
whether the state's interest in preserving life diminishes when a
person is chronically ill, demented, disabled, retarded, or simply
old and close to the age of dying. In order to avoid these contro-
versies, we, as citizens, should require state legislatures to make
the preservation of its citizens' lives its most important, overrid-
ing interest and leave the laws prohibiting assisted suicide in-
tact.
Fourth, the state may properly decline to make any evalua-
tion as to whose life is worth living. 6 This type of subjective de-
termination will be influenced inevitably by a particular judge's
personal beliefs. The Second Circuit illustrated this subjective
bias when questioning "what interest can the state possibly have
in requiring the prolongation of a life that is all but ended?"217
Under such a subjective criteria the state could conclude that the
21'4 Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 820.
215 Brief of Amici Curiae for the States of California, Alabama, Colorado, Flor-
ida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Virginia and Washington and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico In Support of Peti-
tioners at *23, Vacco v. Quill, No. 95-1858 (S. Ct. filed Nov. 8, 1996), 1996 WL
650925 [hereinafter States Amicus Brief] (stating "it is at this critical time when life
is 'all but ended,' that the person whose life is at stake is in greatest need of the
State's protection."); TASK FORCE, OTHERS MUST CHOOSE, supra note 162, at 25.
The Task Force refers to the formula quoted from In re Quinlan: "the State's inter-
est [in preserving life] weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as the
degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims." The Task Force goes on
to remind us that the New Jersey Supreme Court later rejected this formula in In re
Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) when it "ruled that life-sustaining treatments cannot
be legally distinguished from other treatments based upon their level of intrusive-
ness." Id.
26 States Amicus Brief, supra note 215, at *23 (stating that court's analysis was
flawed by improper insertion of "quality-of-life considerations which it used to dis-
count the State's important interests in the protection and preservation of human
life."). But see PETER SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE & DEATH: THE COLLAPSE OF OUR
TRADITIONAL ETHICS 65-80 (1994) (supporting physician assisted suicide and eutha-
nasia especially to relieve the burden on society of those whose life is of lesser
value).
217 Vacco v. Quill, 80 F.3d at 729.
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life of a person confined to a wheelchair, living in a nursing
home, or afflicted with Alzheimer's disease is 'all but ended.'
The state in Nazi Germany made such subjective evaluations as
to which of its citizens should be allowed to survive. 18 The result
taken to an extreme was the 'legal' mass murder of millions. The
Ninth and Second Circuits assured themselves that proper state
regulation would resolve any concerns about the practice of as-
sisted suicide. The Second Circuit, nevertheless, acknowledged
that there are abuses in the Netherlands, the one western Euro-
pean country that regularly practices assisted suicide and
euthanasia.219 Such abuses serve as an indication that regulation
will be an inadequate means of protecting members of our soci-
ety.
Fifth, hospice care22° for the terminally ill is beginning to be
accepted and advanced by the medical community. Hospice care
aims to preserve the dignity of the individual by respecting in-
dividual choices about medical care and providing the dying with
an alternative to death in acute care facilities where they may be
isolated from their families, attached to machines, and subjected
to invasive medical procedures. This type of care also is just be-
ginning to receive the financial support of insurance compa-
nies.221 If the law accepts the alternative of quick, efficient, and
211 It started with the acceptance of the attitude, basic in the euthanasia
movement, that there is such a thing as life not worthy to be lived. This
attitude in its early stages concerned itself merely with the severely and
chronically sick. Gradually, the sphere of those to be included in this
category was enlarged to encompass the socially unproductive, the ideo-
logically unwanted, the racially unwanted and finally all non-Germans.
Brief of Amici Curiae for the Schiller Institute in Support of Petitioners, at *7, State
of Washington v. Glucksberg, No. 96-110 (S. Ct. filed Nov. 12, 1996), 1996 WL
656260 (discussing Nazi policies of physician assisted suicide and mercy killing).
219 Vacco v. Quill, 80 F.3d at 730-31. For a complete analysis of the practice of
assisted suicide and euthanasia in the Netherlands see HERBERT HENDIN, M.D.,
SEDUCED BY DEATH: DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND THE DUTCH CURE (1997). See also
CARLOS F. GoMEz, M.D., REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF THE
NETHERLANDS (1991); Joseph Shapiro, Euthanasia's Home, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Jan. 13, 1997 at 24. But see Alison C. Hall, Note, To Die With Dignity:
Comparing Physician Assisted Suicide In The United States, Japan And The Nether-
lands, 74 WASH. U.L.Q. 803, 825-30 (1996).
220 "Hospice refers not to a place, but rather to a program of care, based on a
philosophy that recognizes dying as part of the normal process of living and focuses
on enhancing the quality of remaining life." Hospice Amicus Brief, supra note 125,
at *2. Hospice care coordinates supportive care for patients who are terminally ill
and their families. The care includes medical, emotional, psychological, physical
and spiritual support. Id.
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inexpensive suicide, insurance companies may exclude hospice
care from policyholders' choices and doctors may be reluctant to
advise their patients about the benefits of hospice care. Dying is
only one step in the life process. For some people death comes
silently without notice. For others death is a long journey. It
can be a positive part of life in which the dying person re-
evaluates his life, reunites with family and friends, and gives
strength and guidance to those he is leaving. ' With emotional
support for the patient and the family and medical care includ-
ing pain management, despair at the end of life may even give
way to acceptance and peaceful death." Suicide should not be
deemed an appropriate or preferred medical treatment. A real-
istic, open, and complete evaluation of alternatives needs to be
made before the Court chooses suicide for us. 2 5
IV. CONCLUSION
Medical technology has advanced so rapidly in recent years
that the law is racing to catch up. While the modern approach to
death is physician assisted suicide, there is no historical tradi-
tion supporting suicide or allowing doctors affirmatively to help
their patients to die. The finding of a constitutionally guaran-
teed right to physician assisted suicide would be tantamount to
finding an overbroad liberty interest of the individual to choose
whatever he wants while entirely negating the states' interest in
preserving the lives of its citizens. Moreover, no Equal Protec-
tion violation exists because the laws against assisted suicide
and those allowing refusal of medical treatment apply equally to
the whole population while the class of terminally ill who assert
the discriminatory treatment cannot be identified with any cer-
tainty.
The legalization of physician assisted suicide would generate
numerous medical and legal dilemmas. In particular, it would
undermine the practice of medicine, the relationship of trust be-
222 Hospice Amicus Brief, supra note 125, at *7
223 Hospice Amicus Brief, supra note 125, at *10-11.
224 George Annas & Michael Grodin, There's No Right To Assisted Suicide, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 1997 at A15.
22 Homes For Aging Amicus Brief, supra note 196, at *3. "Striking down dozens
of State laws against assisted suicide would create a risk, which no regulatory safe-
guards could eliminate, of decisions for death that are made while a person is clini-
cally depressed, incompetent or overly vulnerable to coercion by others and by socie-
tal expectations." Id.
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tween patient and doctor, and the states' enforcement of laws
against murder. The states will be unable to regulate effectively
a right given to an indeterminate class of persons. Furthermore,
the states should not evaluate whose life is worth living, but
should preserve its overriding interest in preserving the lives of
all its citizens. Consideration must be given to the realities of
the scarce resources of the American medical community, the
right to life of our aging population, and the cost factors that will
influence institutions to promote suicide of the terminally ill, the
infirm, and the disabled. The Supreme Court should not rush to
find an easy solution to the end of life debate particularly when
nothing in the Constitution makes it the Court's business to do
so. Further, if the Court finds a right to assisted suicide, public
debate and assessment will be cut short. People will be denied
their right to open and informative discussion on all aspects of
the issue as well as the ability to choose positive life affirming
alternatives to suicide.

